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ABSTRACT
Mostprogramsof taxationandincome maintenance imply thatthetax
rate faced by an individual changes at different levels of laborsupply. As a
result, the individual's budget constraint is kinked which presents problems
for the empirical study of labor supply. This paper developes econometric
methodology for estimating labor supply in the presence of taxes. Equations
formarket wage and shadow price are used to describe labor supply choices
over a kinkedbudget coastraint This approach makesa distinction between
the discrete choice of which segment or corner of the kinked constraint to work
on and the selection of the actual number of hours of work along linear segments.
A consistent procedure is derived that uses all the tax rates faced by the mdi—
vidual and relies onno morestructure thanhas been used inthe previous litera-
ture on labor force participation. This procedure summarizes the individual's
kinkedbudgetconstraint by calculating the expected value of variables that
assume different valueson thesections of the constraint. Techniques for Estima-
ting the model based on a pxobit analysis of the decision to work above or below
certain corners of the budget constraint are presented. Maximum likelihood
estimation is also discussed.
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The purpose of this study is to develop econometricmethodology for
estimating labor supply inthe presence of taxes. Governmentprograms' of income
maintenance and taxation imply'that the net wage faced.byan individual changes
at different levels of labor supply. Consequently, to the extent that'an indi-
vidual chooses his labor supply, he also chooses his tax rate. Thisselection
of taxes by the individual presents problems for empiricaltax analysis. It is
incorrect to use the selected. tax rate as àn'explanato'ry variable formeasuring
tax effects in a labor supply model. This specification is subject to simul-
tane.ity bias because labor supply and the tax rate are jointly' determined. The
problem is that labor supply is a function of all the tax rates faced by the
individual. Although some: progress has been"mad'e'inimplementing such a function
empirically, it has been made by bringing a considerable amount of structure
into the model.1
This study developes a consistent method for estimating laborsupply that uses
all the tax rates faced by'an individual and relies on no more structure than
hasbeen used in. the previous. literature on the subject. Other methods of
estimation are presented as steps in this development. These methods constitute
an empirical examination of labor, supply in which it is possible to test whether
individualsrespond to taxes and achieve an equilibrium. It is also possible
to examine whether models based on strong assumptions and a considerable amount
of structure are justified. Such an examination is an. importantpart of
empirical tax analysis.
-
Thisstudy is based on the realization of a connection between two different
areas of research on labor supply. One area has to do with tax analysis and
the other with sample selection. The first is best represented in a study'by
Rosen (1976) which examined theeffectof income taxes on the labor supply of
married woemn. The budget constraint of these women is kinked because their2
netwage makes abrupt changes as they move into different tax brackets. Rosen
summarized the kinked budget constraint by computing the effect of taxes on
earnings at a standard number of hours of wOrk. Essentially the constraint was
summarized by the average tax rate at a point. Other studies2 of laborsupply
and taxes have taken similar approaches by focusing on different pointsor
constructing linear approximations of the budget constraint. These studies did
not represent the entire budget constraint in any detail. Nonetheless, Rosen
doesremark that "ideally we want to represent the whole opportunity locus"
andthis task is taken up here.
Anothergroup of labor supply studies that is not concerned about taxes
focuses on decisions made at aparticularcorner of the, budget constraint. The'.
choice of whether or not to work -theparticipation decision -'isused. in these
studies to analyze issues of bias in wage comparisons and sample selection. The
analysis takes place at the corner of the budget constraint where hours of
work equal zero. The comparison, of market wage and reservationwage at this
corner has important implications for the, estimation of wages and labor supply'.
This analysis is extended in this study by carrying out the same comparison at
other corners along the taxed budget. constraint in order to develop methods
for estimating labor supply'in the presence of taxes. Thus, the analysis of
sample selection is used to address the tax selection problem discussed in the
first paragraph. Also, it is the basis for finding a way "to represent the whole
opportunity locus" as Rosen suggested..
Section II sets up a two-equation model of labor supply that serves as the
foundation for the methodology developed in this study. This section presents
techniques for estimating the model based on a probit analysis of the decision
to work above or below certain corners of the budget constraint. This section also3
spells out. under what condition these techni4ues can be applied to a nonconvex
budget constraint. While showing that the model can be estimated by looking
at discrete choices, the 'probit'results are also needed It the methodology
developed later on.
Section III brings hours of work into the estimation of the model and
develops a consistent procedure for kinked budget constraints using ordinary
least squares. The procedure summarizes the budget constraint in an intuitively
appealing way by calculating the expected value of variables that assume
different values on the sections of the constraint. The weights in thisexpected
value equal the probabilities of choosing to work on these sections; the probit
results of Section II are used to compute these probabilities. Because these
probabilities depend on the parameters of thle tax program, it is. possible to
simulate behavioral responses to tax changes. Maximum, likelihood estimation fol.
lows naturally from the consistent procedure 'and is presented in Section IV.
Likelihoodmaximization can be used to examine the source of information in model
estimates. Section V discusses the problem posed by the nonconvex budget con-
straint for the consistent and 'maximum likelihood methods andproposes adjustments
for each. The methodology presented here describes a process of defining
a labor supply model for empirical study that brings in as much structure as is'
justified by the data. A summary and conclusion are given in Section vi.
TI. A Two-Equation Model of Labor Supply and Its Estimation Based' on
Probit Analysis
A person decides to work based on the value of his time in market and
nonmarket activities. In themarket,his time is valued at his marketwage.
Outsidethe market the price that an individual attaches to his time is his shadow4
price. A person's shadow price when. he does not work is defined to be his
reservation wage. By definition, the reservation wage of a nOnworker exceeds
his market wage. When a person's reservation wage is less than hiswage, he will
work, i.e., he supplies labor in the market at his wage. rate. As he increases.
his labor supply, a rise in his shadow price is predicted on the usualassumption
that leisure is a normal good. A person supplies labor to the point where his
shadow price equals his market wage. However, in thepresence of income taxes or
other income related programs, labor supply is no longer determined byequating
shadow price and market wage. The process by which a laborsupply equilibrium.
is achieved underlies the methods for estimating labor supply thatare developed
in this study. .Thediscussion turns to a formal description of thisprocess.
The traditional analysis. of labor force participation4 is the foundation of
the methodology for .eflimatiñg labor supply developed, here. The analysis.uses
equations to estimate an individual's market wage and shadow price. A person's
potential wage, w; is related to a set of variables, X, and an error term
e1.
This relationship is specified in the following semi-logarithmic form5:
(1)
. lnw=Xct+
The X variables consist of schooling and age as well as other determinants of
wage. The error term, e1, is assumed to be random and uncorrelated with the X's.
The decision to work also depends on an individual's shadow price, denoted
s. This is influenced by: time spent working, h; a set of observed variables,
Y; and an error term, e2. The general form of the shadow price equation is adopted
from the wage equation as follows:S
(2) ln5Y+Xh÷e
The Y vector includes, schooling and age, as does X, and other variablesthat
influence shadow price alone. Labor supply is assumed to havea single time
dimension measured by the scalar variable h.6 The error term is a random
variable distributed independently, of h and Y by assumption:
A person will work when his reservation wage, i.e., s at h0, is less




LetDP be a binary variable that indicates whether a person works (DP=l)or
isnot working (DPO). The probability of'working P(DP=l), equals the
probability that eq. (3) holds. Letting.F denote the distribution function
of e2-e1 and a denote the standard deviation ofe2-e1, the probability of
working becomes:
P(DP =1)F[(X -Y)/a]
The argumentof P will be called the "participation index" because it determine's
labor force participation; it is denoted J.6
The discussion turns to an analysis of labor force participation because
it illustrates some points of technique that will be used again. The participa—
tion decision is thenatural starting point for estimating labor supply. Estimates
of a and S up to the scale factor a are obtained from a participation analysis.
This is done by dividing the sample into subsamples of individuals who are working,
DP=l, and those who are not working, DP=O, and then maximizing the likelihood of
observing this behavior in thesample.The likelihood function following from
eq. (4) to be maximized is:
(S) L= II F(J )lt[l—F(J0) ic{DN1}0i ic{DP=O} i
where =thevalue of the participation index based on individual i's values
1 -
forthe variables. Maximum likelihood estimates of a/a and /a follow from the
maximization of I...If a variable appears in both X and Y, thenonly the difference
between its coefficients in equations (1) and (2) relative tocan be identified.
When F is the normal distribution function then eq. (5) is the standard
probit model. Although the analysis is amenable to whatever distribution function
is assumed for F,the.probit specification is adopted because this has been the
-choicein the labor force participation literature.
A two-step procedure permits estimating all coefficients separately without
any scale factor. In the first step, an estimate of a is obtained directly by
estimating the wage equation alone. These results are used to impute the log
of an individual's market wage based on X.In the second step, this imputed log
of wage is used in a probit analysis of participation. The inverse of the estimated7
coefficient on the imputed log of wage is an estiniateof the standard deviation
in the denominator of the participation indey. Multiplying the coefficient esti-
mates for Y variables by this estimate of the standard deviation yields maximum
likelihood estimates of the s.
This two-step procedure will be described explicitly. The first step produces
an estimate of eq. (1) which is given as follows7:
(6) lnw=X;+e1 =lnw÷e1
The decision to work now implies:
(7) e2 -< 1nw- . -
Lete' equal e2 -e1and have standard deviation a'. The probability of working
becomes:
(8) P(DP =1)=F[(lnw-YS)Ja']
Letdenote the argument of F; the likelihood function based on eq. (8) is8;
(9) L =IiF(J0 ) It[1 -F(J'0
I
ie{DP=l}i ic(L1P=O} i8
This is the same as eq. (5) except that mw, the imputed log of wage, replaces
Ltand a' replaces a.
An important feature of the two-step procedure is that a.single wage effect
on participation is conveniently summarized by the coefficient estimate of lnw.
An estimate of a' is given by the inverse of the estimated coefficient of lnw.
An estimate of 5 is obtained by multiplying the estimated coefficients of the Y
9 variablesby the estimte of a'.
It is possibleto estimate S usingthe probit analysis based on X and Y'
(eq. (5)) and the wage regression without carrying out the second probit step.
• :
Poingthis require that a variable be in N but npt in Y; let x, denote such a
variable. The wage regression provides an estimate of x1's coefficient iii
eq. (1) -a1.The probit analysis yields an estimate of x11s coefficient in the
participation index -(a1/a)
.Thus,an estimate of a is given by
If there are two (or more) variables in X but not in Y, there would be two (or mOre)
such estimates and a would be overidentified. A solution to this problem of over-
identification is embedded in the two-step procedure. The inverse of coefficient
estimate of 1n'w in this procedure can be interpreted as a weighted average of the
estimatesof a in the overidéntified casej°
Once a person has decided to work, the decision on how much labor to supply-
overa kinked budget constraint follows from a comparison of market wage and shadow
price at points other than the corner of zero hours. The details of tins approach
are presented using..thebudget constraint illustrated in Figure 1. As shown,, earn-
ings areuntaxed up to the level M at which point a tax rate of t is applied to
furtherearnings. Hoursof work at this kink point will be denoted by k. Thus,
a personearns his full wage, w, for hours worked up to k and earns his taxed wage,
(l-t)w,for hours worked above k.Income -
M
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A person works when e2 -
e1
<Xa-YSbut the amount •of labor supplied
depends on other wage and shadow price comparisons. Working below k implies
that the shadow price of time atk exceeds the market wage so that:
(10) e2-e1>Xcx-Y-yk
Using the same notation to describe the distribution of e2 -
e1as before,
the probability that a person works less than k hours is given by:
(11). P(hk) =1-F[(X-- yk)/a]
The argument of F will be called the "index for working up k' and is denoted
The participation analysis described above did not yield an estimate of
ybecausethe analysis was applied where htO. However, it is possible to estimate
along with the other parameters by applying probit analysis at the kink point.
A binary variable OK is used to indicate whether a person works less than
k(DK0) or at least k hours (DK =1).The sample is divided intO the two
subsamples corresponding to this classification and the likelihood function for
observing this behavior is given by:
(12) L= 11 [l_F(Jk)] ie{DK1} i ic{DK=O} i11
where =thevalue of the index for working up to k based on'individual' its
values for the variables. Maxtmuni likelihood, estimates of a/a, /a and now
Va are obtained by maximizing L with respect to thes.e parameters.. The Same
problem in estimating the separate coefficients of variables in both X and 1
arises as it did before. The same two-step procedure can be applied as before
in order to estimate a, S and yseparately.
The probit analysis at the corner of zero hours and at the kink point
may yield different estimates of the same coefficient and as a result provide.
a.richer description of labor supply. For example, children can have opposite
effects on the labor supply of women at. these points)1 The presence of young
children is expected to lower the probability of. working. However, having decided
to work, a woman's labor might be increased by the presence of children. in order
to cover the cost of childcare. In other words, children become a fixed cost in.
labor supply decisions. Consequently, the coefficient of a variable, measuring
the effect of children can have a different sign in estimates of the model. at zero
hours and the kink point. The probit methods described above provide a direct
examination of whether labor supply is influenced by fixed costs or other factors.
Although the above methods for estimating the models using prob'it analysis
were constructed based on a convex budget, they can. also be'applied when the bud-
get constraint is' noncorivex subject to a certain condition. This condition is best
illustrated with the aid of Figure 2. Three kinked nonconvex 'budget constraints,
ABCD1, ABCD2 and ABCD.,, are shown in tins figure. 1'he extension of the common
initialsegment of all of these constraints is given by the dashed line BE.
The probit methods for estimating the' model presented in this section are valid
on the condition that BE lies above the rest of the constraint. This condition12
Figure 2
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is satisfied by ABCD1 and ABCD2. Even when the slope of a segment of the budget
constraint exceeds the slope of its initial segment, as in the case of
ABCD2,
this condition is still sufficient for the validity of the above methods.
If the above condition is not met, an individual could havehis shadow
price equal the slope of the budget constraint when. it is above the extension of
its initial segment and also satisfy the equilibrium condition for working
below k.In other words, equilibrium conditions for working above and below k can
be met. This situation is illustrated by the, budget constraint ABCD3 in Figure 2.
When such budget constraints prevail, a utility function must be employed for
estimating labor supply. As iHeckman (1974b) says "the essence of the problem
involyes utility comparisons between two or more discrete alternatives."
Individuals •face kinked nonconvex budget constraints under programs •of
income maintenance such as welfare assistance, negative income tax plans' and the
social security earnings test. The essential idea of these programs is to offer.
a grant as income support and reduce (tax). it as a person's earnings go up. The
nonconvexity arises because an individual's wage is taxed in the range where'his
earnings reduce the grant (segment (b) in Fig. 2) and then is not taxed when the
grant is reduced to,zero (segment (c) in Fig. 2).If there is an initial range
over which an individual can work without reducing his grant then the methods pre-
sented above can probably be applied. The condition for using these methods
is likely to hold because the net wage after the grant is reduced. to zero is not
likely to exceed the slope of the initial segment. The examination of whether
this condition holds is important because it determines whether a labor supply
model can be estimated using the methods developed here for which computational
procedures already exist or the model requires more complicated analysis.14
This section applied the analysis of discrete chOices to estimate the
labor supply model. The following sections bring hours of wdrk into the estimation
of the model.
III. Consistent Estimation Using Ordinary Least Squares
A technique for obtaining cOnsistent estimates of the labor supply model
using ordinary least squares is derived in this section. The technique is based
on using the distribution of the disturbances in eqs. (1) and (2) for computing
the probabilities of working on each segment and corner of the budget constraint.
Therefore, the discussion on how choices are Eade on the kinked convex budget
constraint must be taken up again.
The probability that a person works at a level less than k, be., along





Usingthe same notation from the last section to.describe the distribution of
e2
-
e1,this probability is expressed as follows:
(14) P(0 <Ii<k)F[(X -YB)/a]—F[(X- —
Thewage that a person faces at k is taxed at the rate t.Aperson may
be willing to work more than Ic at his full wage but not at his taxed wage. In15
otherwords, the market wage can exceed his shadow price at kbut histaxed
wage doesnot.For this reason there is a nonzero probability thatan individual
works k exactly. Working at least k requires that:
(15) e2- e1<Xa—Y8-yk
A person works no more than k when (1 -t)w<satkBy taking the log of this
inequality, it is expressed using eqs. (1) and (2) as follows:
(l6) e2 —e1
>ln(1—t)+Xa-YS —yk
Based on eqs. (15) and (16) the probability of working at the corneron the
budget constraint where h =kbecomes:
(17) P(h =k)+P(ln(l-t)+Xcz-Y5-ykCe2 -e1
<Xci-,Y5-yk)
Thisprobabilityis further expressed as follows:
(18) P(h =k)F[(Xa
-- - F[(ln(l-t)+Xci-Y5-yk)/a]if,
A concentration of individuals working k mayappearbecause some individuals
work as much as possible at their full wage but will not workany more at their
taxed wage.12 H
Finally,a person will work along the taxed segment of the budget constraint
when his net wage exceeds his shadow price at k so that:
(19)
The probability of working more than k is given by:
(20) P(h>lc) =F[(ln(l—t)+Xa — — yk)/a]
The labor supply choices over the budget constraint illustrated inFigure 1
and the probabilities ofinaking these choices are suinniarizedin Table 1. The
indexes derived in this section to describe these choices are given in the table
also.
The technique for consistently estimating the model is based on the probabili-
ties in Table 1 and an equation for the specific amount of labor supplied.
Consequently, the focus of attention turns to the labor supply equation that
follows from eqs. (1) and (2). This equation is derived by equating shadow price
and market wage and solving for h. Far the moment, the problems posed by the
kinked budget constraint are ignored so that this equation is:Table 1
LABORSUPPLY CHOICES ANDTHEIRPROBABILITIES
Labor Supply Choice Probability of Choice*
Nonparticipation, h =0 1 -
F(J0)
Along segment (a), 0 <h <k
F(J0)- F(Jk)
At corner, h =k -F(J)
Along segment (b), h >k F(J)
*Theindexes used in the probabilities of choices are:
J0(Xa -Y)/a,the participation index;
(Xct-Y-yk)/cx,theindex for working up to k;








This equation shows that labor supply is a linear multiple (1/',') of the difference
between market wage and reservation wage. Therefore, this difference determines
whethera person works and how much time he spends working. Even without the
complication of a kinked budget constraint, the participatioh and labor supply
decisions may not be so strictly related. The coefficients of some of the K
and Y variables in the participation step may differ from the corresponding
coefficients in the labor supply equation. The point made in the discussion on
the fixed cost of children in the last section applies here as well. To allow
for this possibility and to simplify the expressions in subsequent calculations,
the labor supply equation will be specified in the following general way:
(22) hWd+u
N is just the set of all variables in X andY; it is doubtful that a
variable in either the wage or shadow price equation would not appear in the
labor supply equation and vice versa. The difference between eqs. (21) and (22)
is in the vector of coefficients. The essential point is that the strict deriva-
tion of labor supply from the market wage and shadow price equations can be
examined empirically by testing whether the coefficients in eq. (22) are different
from those in eq. (21). This point is made by Haitoch (1976, p. 13). To estimate
eq. (22) the problems posed by the kinked budget constraint must be handled.'9
The technique for consistent estimation of eq. (22) using OLS follows
from calculating the expected value of h over the kinked budget constraint.
To illustrate this, let q index the types of labor supply choices where.qequals
1 for not working, 2 for working along segment (a), 3 for working at k, and
4 for working along segment (b). The expected. value of h conditional on W is:
4
(23) E(hW)' = P(q=i)[W+E(uSV, q)]
in q
where P(q =i)equals the, probability of making choice q =1;these prob3bili-
ties are .given.in Table 1. Estimates of these probabilities fellow from the
probit analysis of OK presented in Section II.
The q subscript for W indicates that the value of some variables in IV
depend on the labor supply choice. For example, the value of the tax rate
depends on labor supply.' The problem posed by this' dependency was referred
to in the introduction as the tax selection problem. The source of this problem
is shown explicitly, in eq. (23): the error term depends on q and hence is
potentially correlated with the choice-dependent value of a variables However,
thi.s problem does not arise with the specification given by eq. (23) because
thevariables are not defined by the value of q that is chosen. Instead, the
value of a variable equals the probability weighted average of its values for
all possible choices.
Animportant result of the above expected value calculation is that the
expectedvalue of the error ten equals zero. This can be shown by writing out
the summation in eq. (23) in full. The values of the probability weights,
P(q = i), are given in Table 1. The expected value of u for a given value of20
q,E(uW, q)J, is nonzero because u is potentially correlated withe -
ande2 -e1has been shown to be truncated for any particular choice. Letting
0ue denote this potential correlation and f denote the.standard normal density
function, and using the formulas for the means of truncated normal variables13,



















(25) E(hIW)= [ P(q=i)N jd•
i=l q
Theprobabilityweightedaverage of the expected value of u, asshown,equals
zero. There isnoselection problem becausethe actual labor supply choice
wasnot used to calculate the conditioned mean of h. Therefore, neither
the expected value of the error nor an explanatory variable depend on this choice.21
The only conditioning variables in eq. (24) are theexogenous variables
given by W. The fact that some variables, in partiéular the tax rate, differ
in value over the budget constraint is handled by taking theirexpected value
over the constraint. In other words, the kinked budget constraint is summarized
in an expected-value calculation. This summary of the budget constraintanswers
Rosen!s (1976) request for away to represent the wole opportunity locus.
An important variable in N is the net wage and the way it is treated in
eq. (25) illustrates some important features of the procedure. The coefficient
of this variable will be denoted d-1 .Forthe moment, eachindividual's market
wage, w, is assumed to be constant and observed. The net wage varies over- the
budget constraint because the tax rate changes; for example, in Fig. 1, •the
tax rate for 4 =1and 2 is zero and for q =3and 4 it is t In general, lOt
tq
be the tax rate that individuals face for choice q. Letting 1 be the variables



















whereexpresses summation over q.
The first ten shows that a variable which is constant over the budget
constraint assumes its constant value in the specification given by eq. (25)
since the probabilities sum to- one. The second term shows that labor supply
is a function of all tile tax rates as mentioned in the introduction, and eq. (26)
offers a convenient way to express this. A further ithplication is that the coef—
ficients of ln w and the expected tax rate should be equal. This equality -
/
suggestsa simple test of tax perception of the type carried out by Rosen-(1976).
-Animportant feature of eq. (26) is- that it is po.sible to- simulate responses
to changes in the tax program based on the specification of- the equation-. The
breakpoints and tax rates of the program are used to define the J indexes and
the probability weights follow directly from estimates: of these indexes-. Con-
sequently, when the breakpoints or tax rates are changed, the probability weights
change which results in a potential change in the expected value of hours of
work for each individual as Eiven by eq. (26).
If each individual's wage rate is not observed then there are alternative
ways to estimate eq. (25). One way is to substitute the equation for w intO
-
eq.(26) so that the X's appear as explanatory variables with d1a as the vector
of their coefficients. The estimate of eq-. (26) based on the X's and the-wage
regression can be used to estimate d1. This procedure is identical to what was
done in Section II to estimatebased on a probit analysis and the wage regression.
Again, Let x1 denote a variable in X and not in '1.The wage regression yields
an estimate of x1's coefficient in the wage equation-;1 .Theestimate of eq. (26)
gives an estimate of x1Ts coefficient in the labor supply equation —
d1l
An
estimate of d1 is given by d1u1/1 .Overidentificationof d1 follows when more
than one variable appears in X but not in Y. Another way to- estimate eq. (26)23
solves this problem of overidentification. The solution is analogous to what
was done before: the wage regression is used to impute a log of wage to everyone
based on their X values and the imputed log of wage is used in eq. (26) as an
explanatory variable. The coefficient of the imputed log of wage provides an
estimate of d1. Again, the equality of the wage and tax coefficient can be
tested as a way to test tax perception.
The main result of this section is expressed byleq. (26). Ordinary least
squares estimation of the labor supply model based on this specification yields
a consistent estimate of the model in the presence of a convex kinked budget
constraint. The way in which this specification sunurarizes the budget constraint
in an expçcted value has a certain intuitive appeal. Although the procedure for
implementing this specification re4uires probit analysis as a first step and the
calculation of estimates •of the probabilities given in Table 1 from the probit
results, it is not computationally burdensome. More importantly, the steps in the
procedure build on themselves and constitute a thorough empirical examination
of labor supply. In the process it is possible to test tax perception as well
as measure tax effects.
The model is developed to the point where maximum likelihood estimation is
easy to discuss. The value of this discussion lies in presenting a way to test
the source of information in the estimates of the model.
IV. Maximum Likelihood Estimation
This section will describe ways to estimate the labor supply model based
onlikelihoodmaximization. Most of the derivations and formulas needed to
define the likelihood function have been presented in the previous sections.
However, the specific amount of labor supplied by individuals who work on a linear24
segment of the budget constraint gives additional information on the
probability of their choice, which is put to use here. To be specific, a
personwho chooses to work an amount h* along segment (a), i.e. 0 <h<
isconsidered. Based on the assumptions that individuals can work
any amount they want and that they choose their labor supply so as tO equate
shadow price and net wage, it follows that:
(27) e2_e1=XaYS_?h*
Based on this equality and eq. (14) and lettingfdenote the density function
for e2 -e1,the probability of working along segment (a) at h* becomes:
(28) P(h :h*I0 <h<k)=
Thisprobability and the probability for working along segment (b) will be
expressed more conveniently by defining the following 3 indexes:




segment (b), i.e., h* >k25
In order to define the likelihood of observing the behavior in a sample,
individuals are grouped by the labor supply choice they actually make. Thus,
the sample is partitioned as follows: D0 for ndnworkers.; for persons workin.g
along segment (a); P2 for persons working at the kink point; and D3. for per-
sons working more than k. Given this partition and the probabilities, of making.
these choices, the likelihood of observing this behavior is given by:
(29) L.= 11 [1 —F(J0)] IIf(.)/[(0 )-
F(J1)]
iD0




ieD2 1 '1 .ieD3
i 1.
Asympoticallyefficient, consisteflt estimates of the coefficients in the model
are obtained by maximizing the likelihood function with respect to these
coefficients.14
The above likelihood function was based, in part, on the assumption that
individuals equate shadow price and net wage in determining their labor supply.
However,individuals maynot be able to choose their hours of work..freely because
employers offer jobs for specific amounts of work. As a result, work choices
along linear segments do not followfrom tangencies of indifference curves with
budgetconstraints. By droppingthis tangency assumption the likelihood function
becomes:
(30) L= IT [l—F(J0) H [F(Jo)_F(Jk)}
iD3 i id)1i i
ii[F(J )-F(J)3IIF(J )
ieD i i icfl i26
This adjustment for dropping the tangency assumption is identical to what
Rosett and Nelson (1975) do in the two-limit probit model when nonliinit values
of the dependent variable are not known.
The maximization of the likelihood functions given byeqs. (29) and (30)
permits testing the source of information in the coefficient estimates. If
the value of the likelihood function given by eq. (29) is significantly higher
than that based on eq. (30) than additional information is gaIned by assuming
that individuals equate shadow price and net wage. This result wouldsupport
the usual description of labor supply as an equilibrium that follows from a
tangency of an indifference curve with the budget line.
If the maximum likelihood estimates from eqs. (29) and (30) are not signi-
ficantly different then the assumption that shadow price equals net wage along
linear segments of the budget constraint does not add much information empirically.
In other words, most of the information for labor supply estimation is captured
by the comparison of shadow price and net wage that determines which linear seg-
ment or corner of the budget constraint is chosen; variation in labor supply
along linear segments does not add much precision to the estimate of the model.
This section presented maximum likelihood methods estimation that followed
naturally from the consistent methods developed in the previous section. A
test of the source of information in model estimates was also presented. Both
the consistent and maximum likelihood methods were given for a convex budget
constraint. The probleim posed by a nonconvex constraint and the accompanying
adjustments to each method are presented in the next section.27
V.Adjustmentsfor the Nonconvex Budget Constraints
The purpose of this section is to point out precisely whatproblem arises
for the estimation procedures giveft in Sections III and I'! whenthey are
applied to a nonconvex kinked budget constraint, and what adjustments have to
be made. For maximum likelihood methods the adjustment is one ofinterpreta-
.tion; the likelihood function is. defined in the sane way as before but the
predictive power of the estimates is limited. An adjustment in the probability
weights used in the consistent procedure is suggested as a practical solution
to the nonconvexity problem.
The nonconvexity problem is best illustrated with thebudget constraint
shown in Figure 3. This budget constraint describes a program of inëomesuppot
in which individuals receive a grantor benefit that is reduced by $t forevery
dollar of earnings above a certain amount (bc on the vertical axis). Thbudget
constraint becomes nonconvex at point D where the grant is reduced to zero and
earnings can no longer be taxed. At this point, where labor supply equals n,
net wage rises from its taxed value, (1 -t)w,to the market wage rate, w.
The shadow price at n can exceed the taxed wage implying that labor supply is
less than n. At the same time, this shadow price can be less than the market
wage implying. that labor supply is greater than n.
The following indexes are used to express the nonconvexity problem explicitly:
=((-t)+Xci-- yn)/a ,theindex for working up to n
(Xci -Y-yn)/o , theindex for working beyond n.Income
Figure 3
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<Jwhere e1 and e2 are the error terms in the wage and shadow
price equations respectively. The first inequality says that the shadow price
at n exceeds the taxed wage and the second inequality, that this shadow price
is less than the market wage. Thus, conditions fOr working below and above
n are both satisfied implying that there are two potential equilibrium points.
One solution to this problem would be to introduce a utility function into
the model either by prior specification or through a derivation based on the
labor supply equation. With this function, the ambiguity posed by two potential
equilibrium points can be resolved by choosing the one yielding higher utility.
This solution is based on the assumption that labor supply is determined by
tangencies between indifference curves and budget constraints, i.e., individuals
adjust their hours of work freely in order to equate shadow price and net wage.
HOwever, individual.s may not be able to choose their hours so freely. A
utility function based on an assumption that is not.suppQrted empirically will
not describe labor supply choices accurately.
The tangency assumption is not used in the procedures developed here for
estimating labor supply based on probit analysis and likelihood maximization.
It is not important for theconsistent method because the coefficients in the
labor supply equation are allowed to differ from those in the indexes for the
probabilities of choices. More importantly, the methodology developed here re-
lies on the data to indicate what steps in the labor supply decision convey
the most information for estimation purposes. The methods will be adjusted for
the nonconvexity problem in ways that should not cause significant problems
empirically. The limitations of these adjustments must be weighted against the
potential inaccuracies o a more complicated functional analysis.30
The likelihood function based on the nonconvex budget constraint in
Figure 3 would simply add another term to eq. (28) for the subsample of indi-
viduals. working on segment (c). The probabilities for choosing zero hours,
segment (a), and the kink point remain as given jn Table 1. The subgroup
of individuals working along segment (b) is again denoted by and the proba-
bility of this choice is F(4) _F(Jt). The subgroup working along segment ()
is denoted by 04. and the probability of this choice is F.(J). The likelihood
function is given as follows:
(31) L =ii[1 -F(J0)]n {F(J0 -
F(Jk








Thisfunction does not take into account the possibility that individuals on
segment (b) could have chosen segment (c) and vice versa. Consequently, the
model cannot be used to predict jumps between segments (b) and (c) in response
to tax changes. This limitation in the predictive power of the model may be
less problematic than the restrictions imposed by a utility function.
The probabilities used for the consistent procedure can be adjusted for the
problem posed by the n.onconvexity. Theprobabilityfor working at the nonconvexity
point,Din Figure 3 where h =n,equals .F(Jn) -F(Jt)whichis negative. Since
all the probabiities sum to one, this negative probability at 0 implies that the
sum of the probabilities for the other choices exceeds one by the magnitude of31
this negative amount which is F(Jt) - Thisshould be interpreted as
showing that the comparison of shadow price and net wage gives the expected
result that an equilibrium should not occur around the nonconvexity point.
The proposed adjustment conforms with this result. The adjustment is to sub-
tract [F(J) -F(J)]/2from the probabilities for working along segments (b)
arid (c). As a result, the probability of working in an interval around the
nonconvexity point equalszero as expected)5
In this section, the maximum likelihood and consistent methods were adjusted
for the problem posed by a noncanvex budget constraint. The belief is that these
adjustments are empirically sound and are superior to making additionalassump-
tions that may only constrain the data to fit a particular functional form.
VI. Summary and Conclusion
This study develops econometric techniques for estimating labor sujply when
individuals face a net wage that varies as a result of a program of income
maintenance or taxation. The methodology is. based on the traditional a.halysis of
labor force participation. Equations for market wage and shadow price are used
to describe labor supply choices over a kinked budget constraint. This approach
makes a distinction between the discrete choice of which segment or corner of the
kinked constraint to work on and the selection of the actual number of hours of
work along linear segments. As a result, the methodology can be used to test
whether information in an estimate of the model comes from discrete chOices or
the selection of a specific number of hours. Such an examination of the source
of information in model estimates is important because it determines what assump-
tions about labor supply are appropriate empirically.32
Methods of estimating all the coefficients in the model by the application
of probit analysis at certain corners of the budget constraint have been
presented. Under a certain condition these methods can be applied to rionconvex
constraints.
Comparisons of net wage and shadow price along the budget constraint are
used to derive a procedure for consistently estimating the model based on- ordi-
nary least squares. An expected value calculation summarizes a variable that
changes- value over the convex kinked constraint in an intuitively appealing way.
Such a variable equals a weighted average of its values on the corners andseg-
ments of the constraint. The weights equal the probabilities of choosing to
work on each corner and-segment. Theseprobabilities vary with thevalües of the
exogenous variables for each individual and with the parameters of the tax
program under study. Consequently, an estimate of the model can be used to
simulate individual responses to changes in the tax program. An- important step
in this procedure that precedes the measurement of tax effects is a test of
tax perception.
Maximum likelihood estimation of the model follows naturally from consistent
procedure. The likelihood approach makes it possible to test -the assumption that
shadow price and net wage are equal along linear segments of the-budget constraint.
Adjustments to the maximum likelihood and consistent methods for nonconvex budget
constraints were also presented.
Thereare two points to be made in conclusion that serve as both caveats
and defenses for this study. First, individuals may not know exactly-what their
budgetconstraints look like, especially when these constraints are complicated.
Consequently, they may make their labor supply decisions based on considering only
16 - .
-
afew discrete choices as being relevant. Alternatively, they may make their33
decisions basedon a subjective expectation of theirtreatment under a taxsystem.
The methods presented here may go too far because they rely on modelling the entire
budgetconstraint.However, behavioral responses based on subj ective expectations
may be suitably captured by the way in which the budget constraint is summarized
here in an expected value calculation. A Second point is that variablesthat are
crucial for the classification of individual choices over kinked budget constraints
e.g. hours and earnings -aresubject to errors in measurement.17 As a result,.
this study may assume too much precision in the. enipiridalmeasurement of the
budget constraint. However, the development from probit to consistent to maximum
likelihood estimation follows a. progression in the use of the budget constraint.
How much of the budget constraint is needed for estimation is left to the actual
empirical analysis.
I believe this study is useful because it emphasizes an empirical development
of a labor supply model, The potential gains from this approach are a realistic
description of labor supply decisions,. an insight into the amount of information
in a dataset, and a robust specification of a labor supply model based on this
desription and information.34
Notes
1.Burtless and Hausman (1978) and Hausman (1979) develop a labor supply model
in which they use Roy's identity to derive a utility function from a labor
supply equation. The problem presented by double tangencies between indiffer-
ence curves and nonconvex budget constraints is resolved by bringing individual
tastes into the model. The coefficient.for nonlabor income is assumed to vary
with individual tastes. These unobservable tastes are related to observed
variables that appear elsewhere in the model. Whenever the same variables are
used to serve more than one purpose, misspecification is a serious potential
probieth. A more fundamental problem is raised in an excellent study by Hall
(1975) in which the approach of deriving a utility function from Roy's identity
wasfirst taken. Hall shows that empirical results are sensitive to the way
in which individual tastes are brought into a labor supply model. This issue
ofrobustness in the specification of individual tastes poses serious questions
about Burtless and Hausnian's assumption of a random coefficients model applied
to one particular coefficient in a model already based on strong assumptions.
The motivation of this study is that the empirical development of a labor
supply model wil,l yield a robust specification.
2. See Hall (1973); Brown, Levin, and Ulph (1974); Robins and West (1978); Keely,
Robins, Spiegelman, and West (1978); and Moffitt (1979).
3. Gronau (1974), Hanoch (1976), Heckman (1974a, b; 1979), and Griliches, Hall,
and Hausman (1977).
4. References in addition to those mentioned in n. 3 are Gronau (1973) and 1-lall
(1973, 1975)
5.This specification of the wage equation is generally accepted in the labor
supply literature; see I-{eckman and Polachek (1974), Griliches(1977) and
Chamberlain(1977).6. Hanoch (1976) develops a model in which labor supply is measured by two
distinct variables that are jointly determined. Although this description
of. labor supply has an important bearing on the issues raised hdre the main
points of this, study can be made using 'a single time dimension.
7.If the wage equation can only be estimated over a sample of workers, then
the regression must be corrected for potential sample selection bias. Hano'ch
(1976) and Heckman (1979) have analyzed this problem and show. that' potential
sample selection bias can be eliminated by adding a variable to the wage regres-
sion. 'This variable is the'inverse'of Mill'à ratio and equal
f(J0)/F.(J0)
where f and F are, respectively, the density and distribution functions of
e2 -.e1.The probit analysis based ,on eq. (5) yields an estimate of this
variable.
8. Because ='(I -X(X'X)1X')e1, the validity of.the'. specification in e. (9)
depends on theasymptotic normality of e.
-
9.There is an important statistical requirement in this two-step proc'edure. The
requirement is that Y.be included in the wage regression so that it will be
orthogonal to e'. Otherwise, the estimate ofin the second step is
potentially biased.
10. This interpretation is not entirely accurate because the standard deviation
(&)ofthe error term is not the same as that (a) in the probit analysis based
on eq. (5)
11. This example was first discussed by Gronau (1973).
12. An example of such a concentration appears in my study (1979) of the social
security earnings test..
13. See Hanoch (1976,. p. 15)36
14. A two-step procedure idential to those described abovecan be used to
estimate all the coefficients separately. As before theprocedure is based
on using an imputed log of wage from the wage regression. Further, thehypo-
thesis that individuals perceive taxes dan be tested bytesting theequality
of the coefficients for the wage and tax variables.
15. A utility function may imply that this interval is slightlydifferent, but this
is spurious accuracy given the informational limits of data.
16. Moffit (1979) and Zabaiza, Pisarides, Piacháud and Barton(1979) present
studies based on two and three choices respectively.
17. Lillard (1978) reports that 6.6 percent of the observed variation inannual
earnings and 17.4 percent. of the observed variation in annual hours of work
are accounted for by measurement error.37
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